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

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SOVIET MOTIVES & U.S. SUSPICIONS

Ramsdell Gurney, Jr.



IS CATCH-22 MALE CHAUVINIST?

Phyllis Holzschlag

ABORTION: LAW & MORALITY

David Little, Joseph C. Fleck

ALSO: *Hong Kong's Working Group 7; Satyajit Ray: India's Chekhov; Letters on Berrigan, Indians, WASPs, Ph.D.'s, etc.*

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NEWS & VIEWS

Same Old Gas

Remember the Nixon announcement of last November that the U.S. is getting out of the biological warfare game, except for the herbicides in Vietnam and a small program of defense research?

If you tended to be cynical at the time, don't feel guilty. Promise is indeed leagues from reality.

Seymour Hersh, the reporter who uncovered My Lai, has turned up the information that the U.S. is still in the biological warfare business, and still maintaining a vast stockpile of lethal biological agents.

Last February a high White House official assured reporters that the biological agents and weapons were "in the process of being destroyed." But, says Hersh, about 10,000 gallons of some of the most deadly killers known to man are now stored at the U.S. Army's biological production center at Pine Bluff, Ark.

In addition, the military has developed a dozen sophisticated biological warfare delivery systems (tanks, bombs, etc.) capable of spreading dry or wet biological agents.

Hersh notes, too, that the Army's 1971 budget request for biological warfare research was $23.2 million, some $1.3 million more than what was appropriated for such work for the current fiscal year.

In this context, he reveals that at least one major classified program of biological warfare research is being continued at Dugway, Utah, and that as many as 250 civilian scientists from Pine Bluff and Fort Detrick, Md., are being transferred to Utah to continue to work on the biological program.

One suggestion in Hersh's Dispatch News Service report is that the Army is getting around the President's proscription by developing and producing new biological agents, then devising defense against them.

Thus, under the guise of "defense research," the Army is able to pursue its biological warfare program.

Hersh sums up with a quote from an Administration source: "This sounds very much like what we were doing before."

Students in Politics

Some colleges and universities are arranging to release students for campaigning during the November elections. Notre Dame is evidently not to be one of them.

"Why should students be put in a special category?" Father Theodore Hesburgh, Notre Dame's president, asked. "Many people who work in gas stations and factories can't get two weeks off to work in political campaigns."

The attitude is somewhat different elsewhere. Creighton University and the University of Pacific, for instance, have not only developed a special course to give students an opportunity to work in the November elections, but will also award students academic credits for that work.

The U. of P. course is divided into three parts: guest lectures for three weeks on issues of the '70s; practical experience, during which students work with the party of their choice for the month before election; and a post-election analysis, where students will "draw theory and practice together," or view some aspect of the election.

Students may involve themselves on the local, state or national levels.

Dr. Erling Erickson, history professor in charge of the U. of P. program, said that if the class is successful, it will probably be repeated in '72.

In Defense of Nuns

Censure of the School Sisters of St. Francis — for "exaggerated cult of freedom" and "uncontrolled experimentation"—by Ildebrando Cardinal Antoniutti of the Roman Curia elicited an uncharacteristically sharp rejoinder from priest-psychologist Eugene Kennedy.

Kennedy, who is one of the more patient observers of the church scene, commented impatiently that women religious all over the world will read the cardinal's letter and realize that "the churchman who is supposedly their chief administrator is operating on meager reserves of theology and a classic insensitivity to women as adult persons." (Cardinal Antoniutti is prefect of the Sacred Congregation for Religious and Secular Institutions.)

Father Kennedy made his observations for *Overview*, newsletter of the Thomas More Association. He added:

"It is bad enough that the cardinal should dredge up the discredited distinctions between what is religious and what is secular . . . It is worse, however, that this statement should intensify the conflict that many of the church's servants experience because church officials have fallen so far behind, not only in theology, but in grasping the significance of the mature transformation of religious life-style that has taken place in the last decade.

"Women in particular have shaped a new mission of gospel service for themselves, not to get out of the regulations which Cardinal Antoniutti seems to prize so much, but to take on the serious responsibilities of sharing the teachings of Jesus with mankind."

Kennedy's outlook is one Rome must come around to if yet more young people are not to be discouraged from considering the service of the church.

From Pentagon to NCCM

Columbia snapped up General Eisenhower; the National Council of Catholic Men snaps up General Joseph F. Carroll as its new executive director. The general rates an 11-line entry in *Who's Who in the CIA*:

"Carroll, Joseph Francis; b.: 19.3.1910; 1940-44 Special Agent of FBI; 1944-45 Assistant to Chief of General Investigative Division of FBI; 1948 Brigadier-General of US Air Force; 1950-58 Deputy Inspector-General for Security Questions of US Air Force; 1959 Major-General of US Air Force and Director of OSI; 1960 Inspector-General of US Air Force; 1966 Lieutenant-General and Director of Defense Intelligence. Agency, Pentagon: OpA: Arlington."

What might be called a solid military background for a military age. JOHN DEEDY



Off Our Backs/LNS

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CORRESPONDENCE

WASP Stings

Upper Montclair, N.J.

To the Editor: I never thought I would have to lecture such a sensitive magazine as *Commonweal* about ethnic slurs, but here goes. Many Anglo-Saxons resent the term WASP; if you think about it carefully you would readily see why. It is a put-down word at best and a bias term at worse. And it is also redundant and misleading. First, all Anglo-Saxons must be white, so why the W? And many Anglo-Saxons are atheists or agnostics, so why the P? Therefore, it just ends up as a nasty word and an example of slipshod usage as well. If so, why have Michael Novak and Prof. Tucker been allowed to use it in recent articles? A wasp is a useless animal who can only sting; let's leave him there. HARVEY TURNER

Hickel on the Indian

Washington, D.C.

To the Editors: I disagree with the authors of "Nixon and the Indian" (Sept. 4) only in their somewhat glib conclusion to an otherwise perceptive piece. They sum up by suggesting that the outlook for this Administration's efforts in behalf of Indians is "not bright," their dubious rationale being that "Ted Kennedy's figures show sinking standards of living" while "the Indian himself has no ready or easy solution to his problem."

The standards of life in rural Indian communities are indisputably low—but they are clearly improving, not declining. Last year more than 8,000 new and remodeled homes were completed on reservations, and this year the figure will be another 10,000. More than 8,000 Indians were trained and placed in steady jobs between summer 1969 and summer 1970. A new fund has been established to provide seed money for Indian small businesses. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is contracting to Indian groups the operation of specific

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NO GOING BACK

Elsewhere in this issue Ramsdell Gurney Jr. presents a summary of the revisionist view of relations between the United States and the USSR and the development of the Cold War. The revisionist case is not simple, and it involves a reading of the facts contrary to most interpretations current in this country since World War II. Indeed, the many critics of the revisionist thesis would say that it depends on the careful selection of certain facts and the conscious or unconscious omission of others — of Stalin's paranoid suspiciousness, for one thing, or of the Soviet Union's hostile attitude towards its allies long before FDR's death. All this can, has been and will be argued in the learned journals, and it is certainly not our intention here to pretend to pronounce definitively on a most complex and controverted question.

With that said, however, it should be possible to note that the revisionists have something to say to us without regard to the ultimate verdict of scholars — and of history itself — on their total case. Surely the very least that an examination of the revisionist theory should produce is the realization that this nation too has its own blindnesses, its own predispositions, its own unstated and often unexamined assumptions. In countries like Guatemala we carry out the overthrow of a government and the installation of a non-democratic regime more submissive to our own wishes. In Laos, it was recently disclosed, the economic aid mission has long been simply a cover for our military intelligence operations; in how many other countries is this also true? In South Vietnam we resolutely support a regime which imprisons its political opponents and which was originally "elected" in a contest from which all peace candidates were excluded. In Greece we give additional arms aid to the colonels who strangled freedom in democracy's home. In Thailand we secretly pay another unrepresentative government $50 million a year to send mercenaries to fight for us. The list could go on and on, and it would not be hard to make a comparable catalogue for the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, are not these and similar revelations enough to make it clear that we in the United States badly need to see ourselves as others see us? And if we learn to do that, will not the revisionists have made a significant contribution?

It is in this context, we believe, that one should view two current reali-

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ties: first, the decision of Congress to extend the Safeguard ABM missile system to two more bases, and second, the growing tension in U.S.-Soviet relations since the eruption of the Middle Eastern crisis. As far as the ABM is concerned, it could be argued that the Congressional decision was in fact a victory for moderation, and in one sense it was. Certainly one should rejoice that the vastly more ambitious ABM expansion desired by the Administration was turned down. Yet the fact remains that the Great Missile Race has taken two more giant steps, with all that this implies for arms multiplication. If past experience is any guide, the Soviet Union will now feel challenged to escalate its nuclear and missile capacity, and the world will be one step closer to disaster. One does not have to subscribe to the entire revisionist package or imagine that the Soviet Union has been guiltless in the pattern of rising tensions to suggest that putting an end to the arms race will require a strong initiative from the U.S. as the world's mightiest power.

Such an initiative is particularly needed at this time. As far as international tension is concerned, it was obviously and dramatically on the rise, even before the Administration - inspired, questionable reports of Soviet submarine activity in Cuba; indeed, in some quarters one notes a return to the language of the Cold War which we thought had been left behind us, and Administration spokesmen are already suggesting that Soviet conduct in the Middle East makes it impossible for the two powers to negotiate a nuclear understanding.

The world has been down this dangerous path before, and to set foot on it again would be, we think, a serious, indeed a tragic mistake. Ideology or no, there is no doubt that the United States and the Soviet Union have different and often conflicting interests in many areas, to some degree as we would now have with the British Empire if that were still extant. In the Middle East the United States wants to defend Israel and at the same time keep our Arab friends — and their oil; the Soviet Union is less interested in Israel and more interested in friendship with the Arabs. In such circumstances conflict of national interest is inevitable, but this fact should not be used as a reason for a return to the worst days of the Cold War. As much as possible, such tension between the two nations should be viewed in a reasonable context as a normal power struggle between two giant nations; the inflamed rhetoric of the past might well be abandoned. Above all, tensions such as those in the Middle East should not be used as an excuse to sabotage the SALT talks or other efforts at nuclear control. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the world came closer to nuclear holocaust than most of us then knew; we should not let the pattern of the past repeat itself. No one could win a nuclear war, and the United States should not act as if this were a lesson we had failed to learn. International problems are real, but the world has had more than enough of high noon, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations between the two super-powers.

COMBATING POVERTY

One is impressed with the $50-million plan of the U.S. Catholic Conference to combat poverty in the nation, though it would be more impressive if the announcement had come ten years ago or in earlier response to the pressures brought on establishment institutions by those who are the principal victims of poverty.

One is impressed with the $50-million figure itself, except it is to be noted that the sum is not coming from any existing church treasury. It will be raised primarily through collections to be taken up annually in churches during the Thanksgiving season. Thus it will be Catholics as individuals rather than the church as institution which ultimately will be shouldering responsibility for the success or failure of the effort.

This puts the bishops' plan in a different light and under a heavier strain, particularly given decreased church attendance, decreased church-giving, and increased indifference to the problems of the poor. It perhaps even renders the $50-million goal unrealistic over any reasonably short period of time.

On the other hand, $50 million is not too much to earmark. The challenges are that real. They are also immediate, so much so that we worry about an approach so leisurely as an annual collection. This approach seems to open the bishops' plan to all sorts of fickle forces.

Better by far if the $50 million were instantly available, a suggestion not so preposterous as might at first seem. That kind of money may not be in pocket. But the church in the U.S. has vast property assets, and these could be used, if only as collateral, to raise the sum. The point is that to be convincing, and to elicit the wider support which the bishops' meritorious plan deserves, the bishops should be anxious to risk something besides the generosity of the people in the pews.

Catholics and Communists in Hong Kong

WORKING GROUP 7

Hong Kong is a museum piece, a working model of colonialism in a post-colonial world.

Inside the glass case of apparent prosperity, millions of Chinese live and work in what can only be described as squalor. The wealth they produce is either siphoned off to Britain or goes into the pockets of the Chinese bourgeoisie. The local authorities, elected by no one and flagrantly representing the interests of the rich, rule through a blend of paternalism and brute force. Apart from minor freedoms—a choice of bad newspapers, degrading films, high-priced apartments, polluted beaches, and so on—the basic right of most Hong Kong Chinese is the right to be manipulated, disoriented and dehumanized.

But Hong Kong is cautious because the Nine Dragons of Kowloon are Chinese dragons with very long bodies;

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the mere flexing of their coils in 1967 was enough to panic the Hong Kong ruling class.

It is always a surprise, therefore, when something controversial occurs in the Crown Colony. And particularly surprising when no less prestigious a body than the Roman Catholic church pops a monkey wrench in the works!

The recent Hong Kong Diocesan Convention ought to have been a relatively innocuous affair, abiding by the old adage — "Faith, Hope, Charity, these three; and the greatest of these is Prudence." But Christianity, it seems, can still be embarrassingly revolutionary at times. The Religious Instruction group, for instance, made a *faux pas* by defining a Christian as "a man for others, one whose basic orientation is a going-out-to-others"—a description which scarcely applies to the hard-nosed, business-minded Christians of the colony. The group came close to admitting as much in its draft document: "In our parishes as now organized it seems almost impossible to form a Christian community."

Such hyperbole was quickly corrected and Hong Kong's church looked as though it would survive the Convention with its rhythm of eternal compromise unaffected.

Only Working Group 7 — "The Social Dimension of the Church" — showed a stubborn streak. The drafting commission produced a document declaring bluntly: "We have a bureaucratic government with no elected representatives in either the Legislative or Executive Councils. The Unofficial Members of these two councils are appointed from the capitalist sector of the community, the bankers, heads of some of Hong Kong's largest firms and factories and members of the legal profession . . ."

This struck many as dangerously subversive language, almost the way the Communists would write. Their worst suspicions were confirmed when, in the very first set of recommendations presented, the following paragraph appeared: "A special commission should be set up to study the possibility of a dialogue with the Communists. The Pope has given the lead in this, when on two occasions he met with leaders of the USSR. Seeing that the ultimate aim of the social dimension of the church is to obtain a fair share in the goods of this world, and of Hong Kong's wealth in particular, and seeing that the proclaimed objects of Communism are an equal share for all, and further, that our people may eventually have to live in a Communist regime, such an approach would be more positive than the present attitude of condemnation and apprehension. In this connection it is felt that the main struggle of Communism here is not against religion as such, but against wrong social values. We feel that there is common ground here for a useful dialogue and greater understanding."

The reaction was based as much on political as on religious attitudes. Both Catholic and non-Catholic conservatives, whose ranks included some hardline Kuomintang remnants, wrote letters to the press, charging that Communists had infiltrated the church. The left-wing or "patriotic" organs, on the other hand maintained a conspicuous silence. The middle-of-the-road, headed, in Catholic circles, by the Bishop of Hong Kong, Francis Hsü, worked towards the sole end of keeping the peace. Influential Catholics, some of them part of the power elite of the colony, used every trick in the book to prevent outspokenness.

In an unenviable position was Bishop Hsü, Hong Kong's first Chinese bishop, in office for only a year. His rapid rise through the hierarchy was due to his relatively liberal views on China, and his appointment as Bishop was clearly designed to take some of the bite out of the Taiwan hawks. It was rumored that the Pope had given him leave to explore the possibility of dialogue with the Communists, so that Working Group 7 could well have been his trial balloon.

The pressure from Taiwan and from the local conservatives seems to have proved far stronger than the Bishop had predicted. He hesitated noticeably for a time, then cracked down on Working Group 7 with a strong statement, cutting off further discussion. It was immediately given front-page coverage in the major dailies.

The next meetings of the Working Group were tense, physical violence almost breaking out at one point. Both left and right wingers protested the gag, the latter with a view to "dragging out" the "small handful of people with ulterior motives who have sneaked into the church in order to destroy it." The moderates, though, were exasperated at the dangerous rocking of the Hong Kong boat.

According to latest reports, the Bishop is embroiled in a veritable Cantonese opera of intrigue, the members of the drafting commission have begun to receive threatening letters, and the Kuomintang agents are having the time of their lives ferreting out Communists up and down the burrows of the church.

NEALE HUNTER

(Neale Hunter, author of China Observer, *teaches in the Far Eastern History Dept. of Australian National University in Canberra. He and his wife lived in Shanghai, 1965 to 1967.)*

NEXT WEEK

BERNARD MURCHLAND writes in the Fall Book Issue about Albert Camus:

"Ten years later I still think that the theme of revolt is what is most basic in Camus' writings, infusing them with enduring and dramatic substance. Revolt is man's creative protest against an absurd world. It is both a statement about the nature of reality and an attitude towards it, stressing the individual over abstractions, nature over history and respect for a sense of limit."

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THE MYTH OF THE RAD DECADE

PETER STEINFELS

THE MYTH of the Red Decade has recently been laid to rest. Not that everyone had ever fully accepted the myth, the notion that almost all liberals in the '30s and '40s were uncritical admirers of Stalin, "soft on Communism," and naive advocates of policies which "lost" Eastern Europe and China to the Masters of the Kremlin. The myth, like all myths, contained its tiny measure of truth and its considerably greater measure of half-truth, quarter-truth, eighth-truth, sixteenth-truth, and on into fractions known only to Zeno's tortoise; and so, without ever quite compelling general belief, it did establish a framework for debate and thought, it did compel ritual protestations of patriotism and tough-mindedness, it did limit and divert the energy with which America might have better attended to certain crucial foreign and domestic problems.

Finally, inevitably, the scholars went to work, on the cultural life of the '30s, '40s and '50s; on the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations; on the post-war settlement and the origins of the Cold War; on McCarthy and McCarthyism—and between brilliant books and boring ones, the myth was interred.

Nature abhors a vacuum, however. The myth of the Red Decade disappears, to make way for what, wanting a better title, I apologize to call the myth of the Rad Decade. The myth will be propagated by Mr. Agnew and his kind, but not only by them. Although it will be directed largely against intellectuals, the myth will be amply aired in certain intellectual journals and eloquently elaborated by ranking academics.

The myth of the Rad Decade will take, as its starting point, the undeniable explosion of radical dissent in the U.S. during the '60s and early '70s. It will picture this dissent as generally violent, and in fact destined to violence ever since its beginnings in the civil rights movement. But the real animus of the myth will not be directed against radical students, even violent ones; it will be directed against those supposedly responsible for this outburst.

Soon it will be known that the real responsibility for America's troubles lies with junior professors and New York intellectuals, with weak-kneed administrators and, of course, Dr. Spock. On Dr. Spock's nefarious influence we need not dwell. But add that no student militants ever occupied a building, or did worse, without first obtaining the moral approval of the junior faculty. The Black Panthers adopted their revolutionary stance only after reading *The New York Review of Books,* and they never decided to risk a shoot-out before obtaining permission from Mr. Leonard Bernstein.

Of course, the scholars will finally get down to work. They will go over the documents of the period, noting the very slow movement of the student dissenters toward disruption and violence. (In 1964, S.D.S. was proclaiming, "Part of the way with LBJ!") They will reread the numerous commission reports revealing the solid grounds for student unrest. They will start counting the actual number of classes which were disrupted by radicals; and start counting as well the number of radical scholars suspiciously deprived of tenure by colleagues devoted to academic freedom.

Someone will survey the writings of the "Rad" intellectuals and the "Rad" journals. He will come across the numerous articles in *The New York Review of Books* soberly warning of the dangers of violence and the illusions of revolution. He will come across the harsh words of scholars like Noam Chomsky and Christopher Lasch for brutalized and brutalizing versions of radicalism.

"One who pays some attention to history will not be surprised if those who cry most loudly that we must smash and destroy are later found among the administrators of some new system of repression," wrote Chomsky in *American Power and the New Mandarins.*

"Anarchy and barbarity, race war and gang rule, not utopia, lie at the end of the road on which our instant revolutionaries would put us . . ." wrote I. F. Stone. "The panic, hysteria, and hate which may soon be set loose can hardly provide the crucible in which to create that New Man of whom Mao and Che dreamed. The reforms society needs all require—no matter under what 'system'—an increase in every man's concern for his fellows, a greater readiness to understand, to forgive and to share . . . You cannot beat men into angels, nor make them better by calling them 'pigs.' "

The historians of the future will find these statements and the constant critique of the crazies in the *Village Voice* and other publications and they will scratch their heads. The political sociologists will take over and demonstrate the relationship between the myth of the Rad Decade and the psychological needs of some groups of people and the political ambitions of others. The sociologists of knowledge will expose the role of sorry rivalries in academia and between different factions in the intellectual community. One by one, the cliches about permissiveness and radical professors and activist clerics and romantic revolutionaries will blink out like burned-up Christmas tree bulbs; and the reality, no less disturbing perhaps, but far more shadowed and complicated, will emerge. The myth of the Rad Decade will have been extinguished.

And in the meantime . . .

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SOVIET MOTIVES AND STATESIDE SUSPICIONS

The origins of the Cold War, revisionist history and the ABM

RAMSDELL GURNEY, JR.

The development of Soviet-American relations following World War II has been the object of intense scrutiny on the part of American historians, amateur and professional, since the Cold War first began in 1945. The traditional interpretation of the Cold War, one espoused by most historians and echoed by nearly every author in major texts, is that postwar tensions were precipitated by a calculating, perfidious leadership in the Kremlin anxious to spread Soviet influence and promote world Communism. American actions are almost ritualistically explained as necessary responses to actual or potential Soviet expansionism. Recently, however, a small but growing body of prominent historians has begun to question this view and to point toward a wholly different set of conclusions. Numbered among these so-called revisionists are such names as Gar Alperovitz, D. F. Fleming, Lloyd Gardner, David Horowitz, Gabriel Kolko, Thomas Paterson, and William A. Williams.

With the Senate's original vote in August 1969 to deploy the ABM system, and with President Nixon's announcement on January 30, 1970, that he has decided to go ahead with phase two of the ABM in order to protect America from sneak attack, the debate on the origins of the Cold War assumed new and greater significance. For as has been stated by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, one of the principal considerations in the Administration's commitment to build "Safeguard," and in the congressional acquiescence, is the conviction that the Soviets constitute an aggressive threat to American national security and world peace—just as they did in 1943 and in the intervening years.

What the revisionists suggest, and they provide solid documentation, is that Washington has consistently misread Soviet motives and objectives. As a consequence, the United States has pursued a diplomatic course since the end of World War II which not only contributed in a major way to the outbreak of the Cold War, but has also obstructed steps toward a meaningful *detente*. The decision on the ABM, and the statement by President Nixon, certainly constitute a major escalation of the arms race, and once again reveal the kind of assumptions regarding the USSR which helped precipitate the Cold War in 1945. Let us look briefly at some of these assumptions.

To begin with, excepting possibly the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the American government has adhered to the principle that real cooperation with Soviet Russia is impossible. The conviction has been that the Kremlin leadership, because of the hostile tenets of Marxism-Leninism, cannot be dealt with in a rational, above-board manner. Instead, one must always be suspicious of Moscow's intentions in the international realm, ready to thrust and counter-thrust at every turn. In addition, one must never forgo the opportunity to diminish Soviet influence when circumstances permit.

Ironically, this negative attitude has caused the United States to act as if the world were neatly divided into two irreconcilable camps—though the precise phraseology of that doctrine of dichotomy belongs to the pronouncements of Lenin, the preamble to the 1924 Soviet Constitution and Stalin, and Andrei Zhdanov, who was in charge of ideological affairs under Stalin. Even more ironically, the two-camp theory has become more an intrinsic part of American foreign policy than of Soviet policy.

Secondly, and related to the above, is the assumption that Moscow rarely negotiates in good faith, rarely keeps its word, and makes concessions solely for sinister pur-

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poses. This has inexorably led Washington to embrace the philosophy that one can only bargain with the Soviets from a position of strength. Presidential adviser George F. Kennan's famous 1946-1947 explanation of Soviet behavior and the means to cope with it (See his article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs,* 25, July 1947) stressed this approach and established the framework for nearly all subsequent dealings with the USSR. Warning that intransigence and aggression were endemic to the Soviet system, Kennan called for "the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce" to contain Soviet power.

Although Kennan has modified his analysis considerably since 1947, it would seem that the Nixon Administration, like the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Administrations, prefers the old Mr. Kennan. The State Department has indicated that the ABM is necessary to maintain superiority over the Soviet Union, which, we are told, is brandishing a first-strike arsenal of doomsday SS9 Missiles at the United States, and that deployment will make the Kremlin diplomatically tractable. Naturally one wonders how Washington could genuinely believe that Moscow would choose to negotiate seriously as an unequal or agree to solutions guaranteed to preserve that inequality.

Consequences

The inherent danger of any such set of preconceptions, of course, is that they will become guides to action. And in the United States this very eventuality has transpired. American assumptions about the USSR, for example, whether in 1945 or 1970, have engendered a policy which presumes conflict to be inevitable and normal relations unachievable. The institutionalization of the Cold War—at home and abroad—has been a consequence. They have also fostered a world outlook which defines legitimate behavior almost entirely in terms of anti-Soviet conduct. The tragedy in Vietnam has got to be viewed partly in this context. Even worse, they have thrust the United States in pursuit of quixotic objectives which negate and subvert fundamental American principles. The current splintering of American society and the subsequent groping by different groups for new approaches reflect this dilemma.

It is obvious, of course, that Soviet diplomacy is not the same in 1970 as it was in the period immediately following World War II. The Soviet government, like other governments, has had to take into account new circumstances which have arisen since the halcyon days of the war-time coalition. More specifically, Soviet-American relations after 1945 rapidly developed into an escalating process of hostile action-reaction, and policy-makers on both sides tended to grow increasingly suspicious, rigid, and belligerent. The net effect was that relations continued to deteriorate until the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, which many historians feel produced a leveling off and then gradual reduction of tensions.

The fact that the Soviet leaders, themselves caught up in a Cold War psychology, have on a number of occasions contributed to these tensions, has naturally reinforced American attitudes about the nature of Soviet Communism. This is indeed unfortunate, though not nearly so unfortunate as the impulse to generalize far-reaching conclusions from each new incident. True, Moscow has often threatened, talked tough, proved intransigent, and appeared arrantly bellicose. But this in no way proves the traditional assumption that the Kremlin is bent on aggression nor justifies a policy toward the USSR based on force.

Still, the point that needs to be emphasized is that so long as the United States remains wedded to the Cold War policy of keeping one jump ahead of the USSR in the arms race, and Nixon's ABM is an excellent example, no far-reaching *detente* is likely. Mutual suspicion and animosity will remain. This is only logical. How can the Soviet Union—or any country for that matter—be expected to negotiate lasting settlements from a position of weakness? Such settlements would always be framed to the advantage of the United States and to the detriment of the USSR, a contingency no responsible government could permit. Ex-premier Khrushchev used to say just that, over and over again. Yet President Nixon pushes obstinately ahead, defending the ABM with much the same Cold War reasoning, and making the same assumptions about the Soviet Union, which characterized the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.

Indeed a curiously paradoxical and frightening prospect is that of self-fulfilling prophecy. If Washington continues to treat Moscow as a repository of evil, the Soviets in defense of their own national interest might be compelled to react along the identical harsh lines that Americans have come to expect as an initiative. Washington's commitment to ABM deployment is just the kind of policy which will force the Soviets to take appropriate equalizing measures though undoubtedly the State Department will cite such actions as proof of "Russian aggressive intent." Yet clearly the state with the preponderance of power has got to be the first to call a halt to any escalatory vicious circle; this puts the responsibility squarely on the United States. As the world flirts with armageddon, one cannot help pondering whether a philosophy of "anti-Communism" is not in actuality more threatening to global peace than "Communism."

The Revisionist Thesis

The great contribution of the "revisionist" historians is that they have shed new and significant light on the beginnings of the Cold War and on the conduct of Soviet and American foreign policy. Moreover, they have

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brought into focus substantial evidence which contradicts many of the accepted views regarding the Soviet Union and its diplomacy. Unquestionably the men in Washington, especially those in the realm of foreign affairs, would derive considerable benefit by taking the time to read these historians and to examine their evidence and findings.

The revisionists, as one would suspect, are not in consensus on every point. But they have reached certain basic conclusions about the origins of the Cold War and the subsequent development of Soviet-American relations which make it possible to speak of a revisionist thesis. What, then, is this thesis?

Briefly, the revisionists contend that the United States after World War II was more concerned about forcing the Soviet Union out of Eastern Europe, and reconstructing that area along predetermined lines, than in defending Western Europe, the stated objective. The men in Washington, despite their shrill remonstrances to the contrary, knew perfectly well that the USSR was weak and wished to exploit the situation. Because the wartime agreements assigning Moscow a sphere in Eastern Europe were imprecise, the American government was able to formulate revised legal interpretations, which in effect expelled Soviet influence from the area. And finally, relying on its atomic monopoly, the United States deliberately set out to compel the Soviets to accept American solutions.

On the other side, the revisionists argue that the Kremlin was hopeful, indeed anxious, to reach long-term accords on the future of Eastern Europe. To attain such settlements, the Soviets were willing to compromise, insisting only on minimum security arrangements promised them during the war. But unfortunately, convinced of an inherent Soviet treachery and eager to take advantage of the existing power imbalance, Washington acted to establish American hegemony. Herein, say the revisionists, lies one of the principal reasons for the onset of the Cold War and the collapse of the wartime coalition.

Gar Alperovitz, a leading revisionist historian who has concentrated his research on the 1945-1947 period, believes that during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Washington made genuine efforts to attain compromise settlements with the USSR. However these efforts were cut short by Roosevelt's death in April 1945, and then dropped altogether by his successor, Harry S. Truman. Alperovitz thus sees an abrupt shift in American policy with Truman's accession, a shift resulting in the immediate rise of Soviet-American tension. Some revisionists, such as William A. Williams, argue that Roosevelt did not envision postwar cooperation with Moscow and would have eventually adopted a tough policy. Nobody, of course, can be certain, but Alperovitz's interpretation is well documented and extremely persuasive.

At any rate, the facts are that Roosevelt died some two months after the Yalta Conference and was succeeded in office by a man who harbored profound suspicions of the Soviets and loathed all they stood for (as a Senator in 1941, Truman had remarked: "If we see that Germany is winning the war we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible"). The new President quickly decided to abandon his predecessor's policy of accommodations, and embark instead on a path aimed at compelling Soviet acquiescence to American plans—economic and political—in Eastern and Central Europe. This decision apparently was rather easily arrived at because the United States possessed the only atomic bombs and could thus back its demands with awesome power. Believing the bomb to be his "mastercard," Truman noted on one occasion that the weapon "puts us in a position to dictate our . . . terms at the end of the war." On another he exclaimed: ". . . if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell."

It was in response to this diplomatic assault after Roosevelt's death, the revisionists claim, that the Soviets changed from their moderate position to the Cold War


UNCLE SAM* PRESENTS!
YOUR ABM
HI, FOLKS! MEET YOUR ABM.
HE'S YOURS BECAUSE YOU'RE PAYING FOR HIM..... ON THE "INSTALLMENT PLAN!"
ABM
HERE'S HOW IT WORKS! WHEN UGLY AGGRESSION STRIKES, ABM ZOOMS INTO ACTION, PROTECTING OUR PURELY DEFENSIVE MINUTEMAN MISSILES.
BLAM!
ABM
AGGRESSION
AND HERE'S MORE GOOD NEWS! INSTANTLY MINUTEMAN GOES TO WORK, CARRYING MASSIVE RETALIATION TOWARD THOSE WHO WOULD VIOLATE OUR SHORES!
OF COURSE, ABM CAN'T PROTECT OUR URBAN AREAS, BUT IT CAN PROTECT OUR MISSILE SITES, SO THAT IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, AMERICA WILL EMERGE VICTORIOUS FROM ANY ARMED CONFLICT, EVEN THOUGH HER CITIES MAY BE LOST.!*
MINUTEMAN
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stance with which the West has become familiar. The revisionists pointedly charge Washington with deliberately adopting a belligerent atomic policy toward the USSR in 1945 in order to extend American influence into Eastern Europe, secure additional markets for American capital, and, in a general way, to ensure American solutions to world problems. In short, after the atomic bomb was dropped, American diplomacy presented the USSR with but one real option: either accept American proposals or be confronted with American power and enmity. The blame, therefore, for much of the postwar acerbity between Washington and Moscow rests on the United States.

The relevant point that emerges from all this is that the revisionist historians, through their studies of the Cold War and its origins, have effectively shown that the Soviet Union is not the nest of demons conjured up in the American mind, but on the contrary, has been willing to make realistic arrangements on major issues. What is also clear is that the American government, from 1945 through the Nixon Administration, has either failed to recognize this fact or preferred to ignore it. The result has been the maintenance of a constant state of tension between the world's two super-powers. Let us review some of the early examples of confrontation which did much to launch the Cold War. These examples should be especially helpful for present-day comparisons if the attitudes and actions of the Soviet Union, not just the United States, are carefully noted.

Specifics

Poland became the first major country discussed by the "Big Three" (Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin), and the first of many critical problems affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. At Yalta, an accord was signed which called for the reorganization of the provisional "Warsaw Government," a government installed by the Soviets in the wake of the advancing Red Army. But the Yalta terminology, calling for a "reorganized" regime, was too imprecise to afford a permanent settlement. Stalin, nevertheless, appeared eager to arrive at a disposition which would neither jeopardize Moscow's security nor split the "Big Three," and until his death, Roosevelt reiterated that such a solution would be found.

But Truman did not share his predecessor's view of how to deal with Moscow. Instead of realistic compromise, he embarked on a course to roll back Soviet influence from Eastern Europe. Poland was to be the "symbol" of all East-West relations. Feeling a burgeoning confidence as the development of the atomic bomb proceeded, Truman demanded the Soviets sanction a reconstituted Polish government along Western lines. At an abrasive meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov on April 23, 1945, the President argued his position so insultingly that the former angrily observed: "I've never been talked to like that in my life."

Two weeks later, in what appeared to Moscow as a calculated move to force concessions on the Polish question, Truman, without warning, suddenly ordered the suspension of Lend-Lease shipments to Europe. Although new evidence (See: George C. Herring, Jr., "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War," *Journal of American History,* vol. 56, June 1969) indicates that Washington did not intend the suspension to cudgel the Soviets, the fact remains that the order was implemented in such an insensitive manner that Moscow could not help feeling unduly pressured. Lend-Lease was soon restored on a reduced basis. Yet the rude, drastic cutback of desperately needed materials unnecessarily antagonized the USSR during a critical period.

Poland was strategically vital to the Soviet Union. For Stalin to permit "Westernization" would be tantamount to giving up hard-fought World War II gains while at the same time guaranteeing the resurrection of a hostile state on Soviet borders. Consequently Moscow held fast, insisting strictly on the Yalta pledge of a "reorganized government amenable to the USSR." By the end of May, President Truman decided that the Polish dispute was impeding more important agreements in other areas. The venerable Harry Hopkins was dispatched to Moscow where a settlement was quickly attained. The United States accepted Soviet proposals on Poland, giving 14 (later 16) of 21 Cabinet seats to the "Warsaw Government," in return for which Moscow acquiesced to the American plan for voting in the Security Council.

The Polish settlement, representing a fair compromise under the circumstances, was hardly satisfying to the Truman Administration. Indeed, Washington interpreted it as a painful setback. Determined to make Poland an exception, Truman commenced a vigorous effort to eject the Soviets from the rest of Eastern Europe.

Washington's first step was an attempt to reverse the armistice agreements which Roosevelt had concluded with Britain and the USSR during the last months of 1944 and January 1945. These agreements, often overlooked by scholars, gave the Soviet military almost complete control over the internal politics of each Eastern European ex-Nazi satellite. In Rumania, for instance, Soviet authorities were given the right to formulate policy, and the Allied Control Commission was explicitly placed "under the general direction of the Allied (Soviet) High Command . . ." Similar but less severe accords were signed with Bulgaria and Hungary. It should be noted that the armistice agreements served to formalize the famous 1944 Churchill-Stalin spheres-of-influence arrangement which assigned the Soviets 90% influence in Rumania; 80% in Bulgaria; 75% in Hungary; 50% in Yugoslavia; and in return assigned Britain 90% influence in Greece. The armistice accords were also modeled after a previous understanding by which Moscow endorsed American-British dominance in Italy.

Truman's initial attack on the above arrangements

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came in June 1945 with a proposal to Stalin that the armistice agreements be revised to allow American-British vetoes over the actions of the Soviet commander in each of the three countries. Despite the fact that Truman's proposal was contrary to all previous understandings, Stalin immediately granted a Western veto on the Hungarian Control Commission as well as the privilege of prior consultations on decisions affecting Bulgaria and Rumania. Later, at Potsdam, the Soviet premier made the full concession: he extended the right of veto in the latter two nations.

Having achieved his first objective and flushed with new confidence stemming from the successful atomic raids on Japan in August, President Truman now moved to complete the elimination of Soviet influence. His plan called for the establishment throughout Eastern Europe of "democratic" governments pledged to free elections. By this noble-sounding policy, he hoped to ensure the creation of Western-oriented regimes which would "contain" the USSR and open new markets for American capital. Although both the United States and the Soviet Union held legitimately different conceptions of political "democracy," it was clear that each power was far more concerned about the ultimate external alignment of the reconstructed governments than about their representation.

The Pattern

Washington's tactics were to commit Moscow to open elections, which meant the dismantlement of the existing Soviet-sponsored government, and then to utilize American representatives to work for the victory of the anti-Soviet candidates. Still searching for mutual accommodation, Stalin assented. In Hungary, these elections routed the Communist party in 1945 and the Soviets acquiesced. Similarly, in Czechoslovakia, from which the Red Army withdrew in December 1945, Soviet-run elections resulted in a representative government acceptable to the West. Only in Bulgaria and Rumania, countries contiguous to the USSR and vital to Soviet security, did American meddling loom so threatening that Moscow intervened to make certain that pro-Soviet candidates remained in power.

The point to remember is that in the months following World War II, Soviet foreign policy was directed toward a compromise settlement of principal issues with the United States. If the Soviets were secretly harboring expansionist plans in Eastern Europe, why then did they sponsor free politics, pull back the Red Army, begin demobilization, and tear up the Red Army's main rail connection across Poland (which they did in Autumn 1945)?

What clearly emerges in this period is the pattern of American thrusts and Soviet responses. The Truman Administration deliberately reversed previous understandings, intervened in Eastern Europe to remove Soviet influence, and appeared to threaten a global *pax Americana*. That Moscow should feel constrained to employ strong counter-measures is only natural. Furthermore, Truman's aggressive diplomacy can also be charged, in part, with leading to the imposition of totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe. The present status of Finland serves as a rough indicator of the fate of a border state in which Washington left the Soviets alone.

In retrospect, one receives the definite impression that the primary goal of Soviet foreign policy in Eastern Europe was not the establishment of satellites, but rather of friendly states to act as a barrier against future aggression from the West, particularly Germany. Moscow's security apprehension was certainly justifiable; since the time of Napoleon and twice in the lifetime of millions of living Soviet citizens invasions from the West had swept through the area into the Russian heartland. In addition, Moscow held nightmarish memories of the prewar *cordon sanitaire*, by which the Western powers had collaborated with east European nations to isolate and bottle up the USSR. Stalin had earlier warned Ambassador Harriman: "I will not tolerate a new *cordon sanitaire*." Yet the United States in 1945-1946 energetically intrigued to replace Soviet influence with American influence in border states won by the Red Army in the struggle against Hitler. Is it any wonder that Moscow acted to reassert control in Eastern Europe and assumed an increasingly militant stance toward the United States?

Intimately connected with the fate of Eastern Europe was the German question. Here, too, American policymakers made miscalculations that were destined to antagonize the USSR. Failing to appreciate Moscow's vital concern over the future status of Germany, a nation responsible for over 20 million Soviet deaths in World War II, Washington procrastinated and refused to negotiate seriously until some 18 months after the war's end. To make matters worse, the United States (1) reneged on Roosevelt's agreement that a specific target for German reparations would be set (July, 1945), (2) allowed France to pinion the German Control Commission (Autumn, 1945), and (3) cut off German reparation shipments (Spring, 1946). These actions suggested the prospect feared most by Moscow—the relaxation of Allied controls and the speedy resuscitation of Germany as a citadel of aggressive Western capitalism aimed at the Soviet Union. Although Washington entertained no such scheme at the time, subsequent events proved the validity of Soviet consternations. Today West Germany is heavily armed and integrated into an American alliance system. At any rate, Washington's German policy in 1945-1948, combined with the effort to push the Soviets back to their own borders, left the Kremlin no choice but to form a buffer palladium. It is plainly no coincidence that Stalin tightened his grip month by month on Eastern Europe as his trepidations about Germany appeared to come true.

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Looking back on the immediate postwar era, one is struck by the comparative moderateness of Soviet policy. Moscow seems on several occasions to have gone more than half-way to reach mutually acceptable understandings with the United States. Thus, for example, in addition to the concessions listed above, the Soviets withdrew from Iran under Western pressure, leaving the latter powers in a dominant strategic and economic position; abandoned their attempt to obtain long-sought privileges at the entrance of the Black Sea; supported the anti-Communist regime of Chiang Kai-shek; continued to adhere to the spheres-of-influence arrangement in Greece and Yugoslavia, and to Western hegemony in Italy; and acquiesced, though after stringent protest, in the abrupt American termination of reparations to the USSR from the Western zones of Germany. Internally, as well, the Soviet Union seemed prepared for ideological coexistence; the Soviet economist Eugene Varga was permitted to publish a major study in 1946 which contended that capitalism could stabilize itself for an indefinite period. According to historian William A. Williams, "in every case but one, that involving Eastern Europe, Russia retreated . . . in the face of America's vigorous and militant opposition."

Why was the United States so rash and confident in its anti-Soviet militancy? The best answer is that Washington believed its monopoly of the atomic bomb would frighten the Kremlin into line. Revisionists such as Alperovitz and Williams contend that the bombs were dropped on Japan primarily for that reason. Others, Gabriel Kolko for example, disagree. But all concur that once the bomb had been demonstrated, the American government made full use of the new shift in power to secure diplomatic concessions.

Alperovitz and Williams, however, have assembled impressive documentation to support their view that the United States used the atomic bomb for political, not military, purposes. They carefully detail how Washington hoped to limit Soviet gains in Asia by effecting an immediate Japanese capitulation while at the same time giving Moscow "sober pause" in Eastern Europe. How else, they ask, can one explain the fact that Truman and his closest advisors knew perfectly well that Japan was near collapse (among other things, prior to the Soviet entry into the war, Washington had been intercepting messages between Tokyo and the Japanese embassy in Moscow instructing the ambassador to procure Soviet assistance in terminating hostilities); that a home island invasion would not be needed; and that conventional weapons were more than adequate to bring Japan quickly to the peace table. Significantly, General Eisenhower later remarked: "It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."

Such, then, is a brief summary of the revisionist thesis of the origins of the Cold War. The conclusions are understandably difficult for many in this country to entertain, for they challenge both the standard interpretations of the postwar period and traditional preconceptions about American and Soviet foreign policy. Certainly it will not be easy for Washington to admit that much of American diplomacy toward Moscow has been self-defeating, that the United States must bear a large measure of the responsibility for postwar conflicts and that the Soviet Union is not necessarily the aggressive, bellicose power it has been assumed to be. Yet these are exactly the evaluations which the revisionists are making, and to date, their arguments have not been convincingly answered, though some have tried (See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s article "Origins of the Cold War" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 46, October 1967).

Arms Race

What is so distressing is that the Nixon Administration persists in accelerating the arms race while mechanically citing the Soviet threat as a major consideration. Nixon himself, introducing his ABM proposal in a speech on March 14 of last year, asserted the need for protection against Soviet attack, and a week later Secretary Laird told the Senate Foreign Relations Comm. that the "Soviets . . . are going for a first-strike capability." The tone and language sound tediously familiar. One need only recall the frenetic warnings over the imminent "Soviet invasion of Western Europe" of the forties, the "bomber gap" of the early fifties, and the "missile gap" of 1960. As everyone knows, these dire assessments proved fictional, and the government poured out billions of dollars on unnecessary equipment. Perhaps if President Nixon and his advisors took the time to study the revisionist analysis of the Cold War and its current implications, the whole ABM question could be placed in better perspective, both regarding the USSR and "minor" Communist powers.

Nixon appears to be a classic exponent of the theory that to preserve world peace one must be tough; therefore, never appease the Soviets, never appease Communism. The theory presupposes that somehow American "hawkishness" will be met with Soviet "dovishness." The whole history of the Cold War disproves this. In the 1945-46 period, Moscow was willing to make a number of compromises and concessions to stabilize the international situation. But on basic questions affecting the future of Eastern Europe, the Kremlin refused to back down even when confronted with an American atomic monopoly. Moreover, the so-called tough approach has achieved no significant and lasting success anywhere since the Cold War began. The most it has done is to foster stalemates—for instance in Korea, Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam. The lesson should be obvious: real steps toward global peace are impossible without Soviet cooperation. And cooperation will not be forthcoming so long as the United States persists in building new systems like the ABM.

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IS CATCH-22 MALE CHAUVINIST?

Man's inhumanity to man —or to woman?

PHYLLIS HOLZSCHLAG

The film *Catch-22* has on the whole evoked favorable reactions from its audience. The book *Catch-22* has evoked more than that; it has about it the unmistakable aura of greatness. The conclusion of *Candide,* "Cultivate your own garden" is most like *Catch-22's* in which the rational, sane man is the gardener who confronts cosmic grounds everywhere overgrown with the nightmarish weeds of absurd and violent insanity.

However, for the female viewer the film *Catch-22* is only somewhat less harrowingly marred in one aspect than the book *Catch-22*. For the movie's camera eye uncompromisingly makes visible and thereby magnifies its director's and creator's unconscious prejudicial warts. Ironically the female sensibility is most agonized in these moments when the audience laughs most (when Dreedle's WAC and the servicemen meet). For it is then that the author's conscious, intentional theme, man's inhumanity to man, becomes ludicrously, inadvertently, that of man's inhumanity to woman.

Of the functioning female characters in the movie *Catch-22* only one reaches a level of trained behavioral reflex patterns beyond that of a squawking parrot, and she rises to a Pavlovian howl. In the parrot category there are first of all two breezy nurses, automatons chattering animatedly to one another while they endlessly rotate the same amber-colored bottles from a bandaged soldier's upper orifice to his lower one.

One of these Nightingales is Nurse Duckett who rises in a dream sequence Venuslike from a raft on the sea from whence she waves, smiles, and flings her uniform in the direction of her admirer, who fortified by the sight of her Mount of Venus redoubles his vain efforts to reach her, only to sink like a stone upon nearing her garment. Doubtless this scene is meant to nobly allegorize the eternal struggle of sperm to fertilize ovum.

In another scene Nurse Duckett appears again, this time neither topless nor bottomless, but for the most part headless, except for the briefest of glimpses to reassure the audience that Yossarian is not grappling a dummy or drag. Thus the audience sees only a female torso. Whenever he attempts to fulfill the demands of his nature upon it, one of the knees automatically jerks up into his groin. Meanwhile a woman's voice comes at us from off-camera, disembodied, babbling about there being a war, doing one's duty, not fooling around, and the like. Presumably the significance of the dismemberment is to point the opposition between the simple desirability in its natural state of the woman's flesh and her simpering, heartless imbecility.

As parallel and contrast to Nurse Duckett there is Luciana, the very embodiment of every lush, yielding Italian broad who ever heaved and rolled a bulging backside up and down sunlit Mediterranean streets. Each and every one of Luciana's lower rotations is lovingly photographed at great length from behind accompanied to the end by loudly grandiose mock symphonic strains of music. Yet her voice and brain turn out to be birdlike, her lines mere imbecilic regurgitations of the small store of moral crumbs which she was fed in childhood. She cannot marry Yossarian, she chirps, because men don't marry girls who are not virgins.

Then there is the aforementioned Dreedle's WAC, who in keeping with her extraordinarily meaningful symbolic stature is both nameless and voiceless. Nevertheless she succeeds admirably in her function by suggestively sucking her fingertips, rolling her plump pink tongue over her pouting, Jelly apple lips, reaching under her skirt and scratching her thereby exposed thigh. All this while her incredible beach-ball breasts are bulging as if to

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burst out from beneath the twin khaki pockets of her Army jacket.

As the camera shifts between this unattainable, expressionless, robotlike human lollypop and her slobbering, mesmerized, suffering viewers, the audience begins to laugh involuntarily and continues to do so while the actors take advantage of the situation to play slapstick variations on the theme of Tantalus and the sexual grapes. A good deal of the underlying poignancy of these moments doubtless consists in the comparison between the humanity of Tantalus and his feelings and the grapes which after all are nothing more than provocatively edible objects.

Finally there is the Pavlovian "Nately's whore" whose repertoire consists of not one, not two, but actually three tricks. Count them, ladies and gentlemen! First, she can lie down for any man. Second, she can actually speak, primarily to ask when she is going to America as promised. Third and most meaningful of all, she turns in the end into a mindless brute force of destruction when she pursues a vendetta against Yossarian. Since he has told her of Nately's death he must therefore be responsible for it, according to her canine level of logic.

Female Function

Can anyone after viewing this film seriously argue that the functioning females in it serve any other capacity than as ample, simple containers for the convenient deposit of semenal effluvia, exactly as brass spittoons receive sputum and toilet bowls, excrement and urine? Can anyone after viewing this film seriously argue that the functioning females in it possess anything beneath their scalps resembling brain matter, or if they do possess such, whether it matters at all? Is not the female's sole purpose and function in both novel and movie *Catch-22* to serve as quick snatch, as contrast to and diversion from the real business of life and death?

Lives there a single normal human being from the age of puberty on, if not earlier, who does not wish to radiate sexual attractiveness to someone other than himself? Yet the assumption that the female *only* is the repository of stereotyped sexual attributes is a denial of this fact at the same time as it is a denial of her individual humanity in the precise way that the individual humanity of any member of any oppressed group throughout history has been denied. To extract one given aspect from a female human being, to make her and it representative of a given group, to do this on an entirely artificial and arbitrary basis is to practice discrimination, nothing more, nothing less.

It is for a woman exactly as it must be for a black who has for centuries confronted endless portraits of shiftless, smiling, feckless innocents gifted inevitably with an innate sense of rhythm. It is for a woman exactly as it must be for the Jew who seemingly must shrug forever under the burden of his miserliness, his Midas touch, his Merlinlike financial control over whatever inimical nation happens to need a scapegoat at the time. Blacks, Jews, women. All human, all people, all with individual, unique qualities.

Just as statistics of anthropological, biological, medical and financial studies have exposed the ridiculous (when not tragic) basis of discrimination against blacks and Jews, so similar statistics have revealed that abundance and comparable size of brain matter has no correlation in inherent sexual differences. Moreover the question of in what ways this brain matter propels its living host has no innate correlation in sexual differentiation, but is related almost entirely to directions received from the environment; in short, *attitudes and behavior are the result of training.*

Once aware of this fact the mass media can no more afford to depict stereotyped dehumanization of a female (which automatically occurs when she becomes almost entirely a sex object or symbol) than it can afford to continue the commercials which depicted blonde beauties as having more fun while millions of black eyes watched; or those programs in which habitual, hardened criminals automatically possessed swarthy skin, sleek black hair, and Italian surnames; or films in which howling red men invariably bit the dust after the cavalry, WASP to a man, came to the rescue.

In no sense am I advocating the disappearance from the mass media of whatever is naturally sexual, whether in male or female. What I am advocating is that sexuality be considered a natural corollary to being alive, to being human, a natural part of the complex human experience to be shared in equal measure by both sexes. In plain biological fact as well as in the realms of romance woman is no more of a diversion to man than is man a diversion for woman. Each is equally important to the other; both together are the very sum of life itself. To diminish one sex is to diminish both, whereas to liberate woman from the prison of the stereotype is to liberate man as well; it is what I call human liberation. Hopefully the mass media when finally sensitized to their own unconscious prejudices (as was the case in the Black is Beautiful reaction) will in future depict woman in human rather than essentially sexual dimensions.

Let us no longer abuse our natural sexuality for the sake of conforming to the passing vogue of some arbitrary cultural norm. Each individual is as attractive as he or she happens to be. Sexuality is not an exclusive attribute of either sex. A culture which teaches that one sex is formed *a priori,* inherently, in a greater or lesser sexually attractive mold than that of the other sex is propagating a Puritanical or Victorian myth. Such a culture is consciously or unconsciously distorting the basic formula of human sexuality. As the eminent philosopher once put it in her paraphrase of Genesis: "It takes two to tango."

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INDIA'S CHEKHOV

THE SCREEN

Satyajit Ray has, as of my writing, directed seventeen films, some half-dozen of which have been commercially released in the United States. His first film, *Pather Panchali* (1955), achieved a certain success in this country in part due to its image as a kind of "UNESCO cinema" and of Ray as the heir to De Sica. *Pather Panchali* was the first film of a trilogy, the second of which was *Aparajito* (1956) (which tended to bear out ascriptions of a De Sica influence), and the third, *The World of Apu* (1959); shown as a triple bill, the trilogy as a whole also achieved a measure of success in the early sixties with the college audience. Even such success, however, was never to be repeated. Though most new Ray films manage to make a dutiful appearance at the New York and San Francisco film festivals where they can usually count on cross-cultural pieties and unsold tickets, it is almost invariably to be swallowed up afterwards by a silence as inviolable as that from which they suddenly emerged; Godard makes conversation, and, meanwhile, the campus crowds have discovered more congenial pleasures in double bills of Richard Lester. In the midst of the hippie-rock-raga boom, I have sat in a San Francisco theater during a rare Ray booking, and found myself barely shouting distance from the nearest person to me in the audience.

Not the least of reasons for the way popularity has eluded Ray has been, I would guess, the unmysterious one of the absence in his films of "stars," even of the more highbrow sort (Belmondo, Karina, Leaud, etc.) that has been featured in the films of Godard and has accounted perhaps more than generally acknowledged for even such limited popularity as Godard's films have attained (though by now their director, cool smile and inseparable shades, has himself achieved this sort of stardom). Ray has tended to favor the use of non-professional actors in his films, and, at least in the West, the failure of his principals to attract a following has been intensified by what might be called the wog syndrome, in which a Soumitra Chatterjee is virtually indistinguishable from a Madhabi Mukherjee. For the Western audience, one Ravi Shanker probably taxes recognitory faculties to the full.

In any event, this is not likely to be true of Ray's forthcoming work, announced as an English language film to feature Peter Sellers; and, though it seems hardly credible that any Ray film could do for its director's reputation what *Blow-Up* has for Antonioni's, some larger public seems assured. In fact, whatever effect Ray's new film may have on his reputation, I think it can have none on his actual stature. And that stature, to put it bluntly, is quite simply that of being one of the half-dozen or so greatest artists ever to have worked in the medium of film.

Despite the UNESCO label, perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Ray's body of work is its range and versatility. Even within the trilogy, each of the films is strikingly different from the others: *Pather Panchali,* a Dovzhenko-like poem of the earth and of human lives coming to definition against the anonymity of nature's cycles; *Aparajito,* owing less perhaps to De Sica than to Zavattini in the latter's call for an open form; and *The World of Apu,* in which a narrative of spiritual questing that reminds one of Hesse in its largeness of gesture is given an embodiment whose critical detachment and admittance of a natural world are as different from the emotional posturing of Hesse as they are again from any of the stereotypes of a film by Ray. Before completing the trilogy, Ray made two other works, *The Philosopher's Stone* (1957), a comic fantasy and the only one of Ray's films I would characterize as slight, and *The Music Room* (1958), a gothic study in obsession and decay that more nearly evokes the fateful cosmos of a Kleist (and of his "St. Cecilia, or The Power of Music," in particular) than it does any world of a perfectable human nature. Despite its backdrop of societal transformation, the essential force of *The Music Room* resides in the extent to which we are drawn into its protagonist's proud madness; the extent to which we are brought even to admire the declining aristocrat's compulsive sacrifice of all else to the thrall of a more perfect music.

Now I mention names like Hesse and Kleist not to ascribe influences nor even less to provide dignity by association for an artist I regard, in both cases, a richer one than those to whom I make comparisons; rather, to suggest succinctly some sense of the effects, and the variety of effects, which Ray's art encompasses. Nor have I come close to exhausting the range of character there is to be described in it. For what is the longer story of *Two Daughters* (1961) if not the classic "Jewish mother" joke taken beyond this to become a joyous celebration of sexual awakening, and *Mahanagar* (or *The Big City;* 1963) but a Hollywood of the '30s-style sophisticated comedy of the emancipated female and sexual role reversals, which, once deftly achieved at this level, unobtrusively extends itself to work at quite another. *Mahanagar* is probably also, quite apart from Hollywood comparisions, one of the least typical of Ray films in being one of the most visibly plotted. Like those farces it resembles, the action develops with a kind of independently propellent comic logic; when the wife is forced by family economics to go out into the world and get a job, we know her husband will eventually lose his; the logic of the situation demands it. But, even as this comedy of situation is allowed to run its traditional course, the characters in it are so fully fleshed out as to create of their relations a comedy of character that is both remarkably interactive with the farcical action and

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yet developmentally independent of its motoric drive.

Mahanagar has been judged a relative failure in Ray's work (its farcical plottedness measured against a Zavattini-like norm) by several of those critics favorably disposed toward him, who often seem as unresponsive as hostile critics to the formal and temperamental variety with which Ray's work abounds. One is reminded how ill-served Ray has often been by even his admirers, whose writing is often full of a praise for Ray's "humanism" which succeeds only in making his work like the hopelessly dull UNESCO cinema its detractors have claimed it to be.

Whatever qualities talk of "humanism" may actually refer to in Ray, it seems to me that the salient quality of his work is its almost intoxicating sensuousness, its all but overwhelming apprehension of a physicial world of flesh and fabrics, textures, tangible surfaces, material presences, odors, sexual vibrations, body heat; probably no other films convey to one as do Ray's the sense of an actual temperature emanated from the screen. What one can say critically of such an accomplishment, I do not know; perhaps one can only attempt to appreciate it. Ray's films defy analysis in the literal sense of being entities which it seems virtually impossible to separate into their component parts—that is to say, theme, style, etc.—even for purposes of discussion. They are narratives of such lucid simplicity that even art itself seems to disappear into their general transparency.

Ray's films are perhaps the supreme instance in film of a purely narrative art; one—like Chekhov's, in his stories—in which all abstract meaning is merged into a narrative whose reality seems to be confluent with our own; whose characters seem as fully alive, and whose events seem as wholly independent of artistic arrangement. Possibly one can say that much in Ray's films is touched by a sense of the primacy of life's natural rhythms over any plans which individuals may try to impose on them; but, if this sense does enter into the films, it is not as an abstract idea, or theme whose working out may be explicated by the action, but rather as something which the action is exactly equivalent to and which it celebrates. "Usually this happens naturally. If not, we must make it happen," the young husband in *Two Daughters* pontificates to his reluctant bride after her forced marriage.

"You just got married," he reminds her.

"I didn't!" she cries.

". . . I mean you did but you didn't want to."

And later, when, after running away and their long separation, she returns to him: "You came here! Why?"

Because, she answers, "I wanted to."

And the film itself, like all of Ray's films, is no more and no less than a celebration of those forces in life which, in their own time and fathomless mystery, bring things together, and rend them apart.

WILLIAM S. PECHTER

BOOKS

Can reason rule on an impassioned subject?

Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality

DANIEL CALLAHAN

Macmillan, $14.95

DAVID LITTLE



According to one common opinion, it is no good trying to discuss public issues with reason and care. Such issues reduce to emotion and passion; therefore, emotional appeals are the appropriate form of public discourse. We can be grateful that Daniel Callahan completely disregards this opinion in turning his attention to abortion. He has set out to write a "calm book," and he succeeds admirably. In marshalling data, in canvassing the vast literature, in arguing his own legal and moral position, he is fair, cautious and generally thorough. If his constructive arguments do not always pass muster, he makes it easy to follow his argument and to locate points of controversy.

Though Callahan has not disposed of the problem of abortion, he has written an indispensable book on the subject. If all who have ready views on abortion will read this volume, they cannot help but be chastened by the complexity of the issues. One hopes that Callahan's modesty and open-minded curiosity will counteract the self-assurance with which so many souls on all sides of the debate approach abortion.

In the first two sections, Callahan deals informatively with the technical issues, including the questions of medical, psychiatric and fetal "indications," and with the "restrictive," "moderate" and "permissive" abortion laws variously found around the world. But while the conclusions in these sections play an important role, Callahan's main interest is in the moral aspects of abortion and with their revelance to legal policy. As between those Catholics who find abortion morally and legally in-

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tolerable, and the proponents of "abortion on request," Callahan adopts a compromise position. In sympathy with the latter group, he favors permissive abortion laws which, while broadly regulating medical conditions, would leave all abortion decisions finally up to the mother. At the same time, he finds the moral tenets of the abortion-on-request position deficient, and he appreciates, up to a point, the traditional Catholic concern for the welfare of the fetus.

Does Callahan succeed at compromise? I think not. That is sad to say, since his position is in many ways appealing, and he strives so manfully to take all sides into account. When Callahan argues for his own "moral policy," he runs aground at two points: 1) He never quite gets the foundations of his position straightened out, causing his argument to falter; 2) His particular distinction between law and morals—so important to his conclusions—is not satisfactory.

1) Callahan properly seeks a moral position that does not rest only on religious presuppositions. In a religiously pluralistic world, moral imperatives, if they are to do their job, must transcend confessional differences as far as possible. He believes he has found common ground among religious and non-religious moralists in the concept "sanctity of life." This concept is a broad, rather vague, principle which "suggests" five rules that regulate the treatment of human life. These rules have to do with the preservation of the human species, the protection of individual life, provision for self-determination regarding personal destiny, and so on.

According to Callahan, the major difficulty with the Catholic position and the abortion-on-request position is formally the same: Each has unwarrantly selected one rule to the exclusion of the others. The Catholics have overemphasized the right to life of the fetus, and the abortion-on-request people tend to think only of the mother's right to self-determination. What is required is a "weighing" or "balancing" of the different rules involved in each particular situation.

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

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

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But there is no predetermined way the balancing can go on, and there are not even many guidelines to help a person know how he might go about balancing one rule against another. At certain points, all Callahan can recommend is the adoption of an attitude toward abortion that is "reasonable, sensitive and imaginative," one that is open to the flexibility of human choices.

Callahan's problems begin when he tries to justify the concept "sanctity of life." His argument, which he seems to feel is close to Kant, goes like this: Men are valuing beings; if they want to value anything at all then they must presuppose the value (or sanctity) of human life, since men must exist before they can value. This is not persuasive, nor is it anything like Kant's position. It does not seem true that for an individual to engage in valuing he must necessarily presuppose the value of human life—certainly not *all* human life, and not even his own if he has a death wish.

As a matter of fact, the heart of Kant's position is that because of the wide divergence in things men value, and because of the impossibility of reconciling the divergent values in any compelling way, the only (rational) option is to respect the equal right of every man finally to determine his own values, which is to treat every man "as an end in himself." Kant's version of the "sanctity of life" or "respect for persons" is *not* rooted in some underlying value consensus, but rather in the lack of such a consensus. From Kant's viewpoint, the language of right is *not* reducible to the language of value, contrary to Callahan. That is precisely what the "Copernican Revolution in Ethics" is all about.

This is not an unimportant point so far as the practical consequences for abortion go. As James Gustafson puts it in a passage cited by Callahan, but not appreciated by him, "if one speaks of the fetus's 'right to life,' it is more difficult to justify an abortion than if one speaks of the value of the life of the fetus in relation to a whole host of other values which might be jeopardized to some degree if the fetus is permitted to live." Callahan does not see this distinction clearly. He himself uses "rights language," but without taking the consequences of doing so. He argues that only "serious reasons" could morally override the "presumptive right" of the fetus of life. These reasons may not be "wholly self-interested," and they must arise from a genuine conflict of rights or from "extraordinary circumstances" or from a situation in which "no other reasonable options are available." Moreover, Callahan offers a convincing criticism of the popular viewpoint which determines the worth of a fetus according to whether he is wanted (or valued) by his mother.

But the force of these comments is in the direction of respecting the life of the fetus whether it happens to be valued by anyone or not. It is to establish a claim on behalf of the fetus: Because the fetus is a potential human being, it has a "presumptive right" to be treated as an end in itself, and not simply as a means to someone else's "self-interested" ends. What ought to follow from such an argument is a careful and extensive discussion of what constitutes "serious moral reasons" in conflict of rights situations (including a lengthier discussion of the moral relevance of various "indications"). Since by Callahan's own argument, not just any old value ought to be morally allowed to count against the rights of the fetus, we need more precise guidance as to what may be allowed to count against it. Such a discussion need not lead to rigid or absolutist conclusions. It will simply help to *make sense* of the moral issues involved as Daniel Callahan has himself introduced them.

2) Callahan's attempt to distinguish legal from moral aspects of the abortion issue is very disappointing. Though he does not unfortunately define "morality" in distinction from "law," he understands the law as being concerned with the "common good" of a society. So long as a practice does not contravene the common good, it ought to be viewed as lawful. The practice of abortion-on-request cannot be shown to threaten the common good in that it is not hazardous to the welfare of the living, says Callahan. Therefore, abortion-on-request should be legalized, whatever one's moral attitudes might be.

Even if one is in favor of legalized abortion, this argument is no help. Surely the law, among other things, must protect individual rights (as Callahan admits in passing). The critical question concerning abortion is whether a "potential individual," such as a fetus, properly falls under the law's protec-

Christ-Centered Texts



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tion of individual rights. If it does, then that changes one's moral appraisal of what sort of treatment a fetus "has a right to expect."

I am not unsympathetic to Callahan's desire to liberalize abortion laws, and all the data he brings forward regarding the destructive consequences of restrictive, but often unenforced, abortion laws must be taken very seriously. My only objection is that Callahan's argument does not provide an adequate foundation for the permissive legal policy he seeks.

Theological Studies: Abortion

VARIOUS AUTHORS

March issue, 1970, $2

JAMES C. FLECK

The contributors to *Theological Studies'* abortion issue take up the problem from different starting points but touch on all the critical points: when does a fetus become a human being? can the Church's moral teaching change? why do Catholics and other ethnically oriented groups differ so radically on this issue? what is the role of law in abortion? Very little is new. Several of the authors, Milhaven and Drinan, have had summary articles in recent issues of *Commonweal.* But each of the contributors does add one new insight or another to the ongoing debate.

Andre Hellegers clinically details fetal development noting the problems arising from recent studies on recombination of human zygotes after initial twinning. In the case of multiple births, the philosophical school that has held for the immediate creation of a human soul by God traditionally opted for a human soul in the first undivided cell, with subsequent souls created at each cell division. Hellegers sees a problem with the fact of recombining. "We are beginning to see cases in which one of the two souls must have disappeared without any fertilized egg having died." Dr. Hellegers doesn't pursue the problem but other possibilities may appeal to the imagination. Perhaps both souls remain struggling for control of the human pschye, accounting for Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, schizophrenia, and the warring members that bothered St. Paul and most other Christians since. A more likely argument is that the human soul is not present in the early development of the fertilized ovum, a position advocated by Joseph Donceel, S.J., of Fordham.

Donceel argues for delayed hominization, pointing out this was the preferred position of the Latin Fathers and the Scholastics. While Donceel admits that St. Thomas was wrong in following Aristole's biology, he was right in proposing a succession of forms. He points out that Hylomorphism requires matter proportioned to its form and that chromosomes and DNA are not sufficiently complex to receive an intellectual soul. In following Teillard de Chardin closely, Donceel hints that human souls may not be created by God directly with the parents only material causes. He posits a "creative transformation" in which a human soul is caused immediately

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

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by the genetic matter given by the parents. Just as human consciousness and man evolved through time across various thresholds, so too the embryo. Donceel says, "I do not know when the human soul is infused into the body, but I for one, am certain that there is no human soul, hence no human person, the first few weeks of pregnancy."

Taking exception to this position is Joseph Mangan, S.J., of Chicago's Loyola University. Mangan believes that normally the human person exists in the human zygote from the first moment of conception. Mangan traces the history of the scriptural, philosophical, and doctrinal sources for the immediate creation of the soul by God and gives a monumental set of scriptural texts none of which touch directly on abortion. Mangan concludes his contribution with citations from canon law, the Holy Office, Pius XII's *Casti Conubii*, and the documents of Vatican II which denounced infanticide and abortion as "unspeakable crimes."

Woodstock Seminary's John Milhaven, S.J., concentrates on why Catholics feel so strongly against abortion and other well-meaning people don't. He finds the answer in two radically differing epistemologies, one classical, the other modern. The classical mind, which includes traditional Catholic morality, holds human life inviolable from direct attack, but has worked out a casuistry which permits direct killing in war, capital punishment, and in the past has tolerated such evils as slavery and torture. But the classical mind does not include in its calculus the death experience of the victim, which is the same whether he is killed intentionally or under the double-effect principle.

Opposed to this is the modern mind grounded in situationalism and willing to admit the direct killing of the innocent if circumstances warrant. Yet it is this mind that has fought so successfully for abolition of slavery, social injustice, capital punishment and modern war. But they feel there is an essential difference between an experiencing human being and an unborn child. Since this group has served mankind so well, Milhaven advocates tolerance for their abortion view.

Jesuit lawyer and congressional candidate Robert Drinan sees abortion soon to be as available as sterilization today. He urges Catholics to seek common ground with those opposed to abortion on demand and points out several areas where he hopes traditional Catholic teaching may prove flexible. One area is that of certainly defective fetuses. Drinan says nature herself attempts to abort such abnormal conceptions and thinks medicine should aid nature in this task. But Drinan seems to be having second thoughts on the withdrawal of all laws against abortion,

Paul Tillich's Dialectical Humanism

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LEONARD F. WHEAT

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Abortion: New Studies

The literary treatment of abortion has been odd. The journal literature on the subject is immense—ranging from specialized medical articles, which number in the thousands, to newspaper pieces, which reach the tens of thousands. But there have been comparatively few books on the subject, barely more than a handful. At least that was the case until the past year or so. Now a number of important books are appearing, and with them some more sustained argumentation and statistical analysis.

Germain Grisez's book *Abortion: The Myths, The Realities and the Arguments* (Corpus Books. $15) is a massive and detailed study of the problem from a number of perspectives. It makes no pretense to detachment. Grisez specifies clearly his opposition to abortion, and then, with the help of a thorough analysis o data and arguments, tries to show th defects of those positions which favo abortion. The coverage is thorough taking up the question of when lif begins, the sociology of abortion medical and religious views, the lega setting, the ethical arguments and th issue of public policy.

Abortion has been a favorite topi in the past few years on the confe ence circuit. Two of the conferenc have been particularly important. Th first was a conference held in th summer of 1967 in Washington und the sponsorship of the Kennec Foundation and the Harvard Divini School. By and large, while all viev points were represented at the confe ence, the general flavor was an

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possibly because of his candidacy in a highly Catholic congressional district. He argues that to end an apparently unenforceable law against abortion would endanger other laws attempting to protect men from harming each other and to the weakening of the inviolability of human life in general.

Non-Catholic thinking is represented by George Williams of Harvard. He examines the difference in the Old Testament between the Massoretic and Septuagint texts explaining that Protestant thought is essentially scriptural and not traditional. This in turn explains why modern Protestants have abandoned the anti-abortion attitudes of Luther, Calvin, and other reformers. Williams opts for a "Sacred Condominium" of parents plus the State to decide each abortion case with an abortion court room in each hospital and medical advocates representing both parents and fetus along with legal and ethical experts. It is a highly contrived method whose complexity destines the idea to oblivion since it would serve the interests of neither those favoring easier abortion or those opposed.

CORRESPONDENCE

(Continued from page 59)

programs historically run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Surely these efforts will help solve some chronic problems. What's more, they are being directed by Indians, a great many of whom have moved into management and advisory capacities within this Department and this Administration. To expect them to solve in a year's time all the problems of poverty and exclusion that have plagued Indians for a century is to assume that Indians are superhuman.

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In the main, the authors of "Nixon and the Indian" have interpreted the Administration efforts admirably, just as they have captured the essence of the complexity of some Indian issues.

abortion. Some of the more important papers given at that conference, particularly those in which the anti-abortion flavor was most pronounced, have now been gathered together in an edited and often different form in John T. Noonan (editor), *The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives* (Harvard University Press. $8.95). The strength of the book lies in its discussions of the legal and ethical theories concerning abortion. Of quite a different sort are the proceedings of a conference held in Hot Springs, Virginia, in the fall of 1968 under the sponsorship of the Association for the Study of Abortion. While, once again, "all viewpoints" were represented, the flavor of that conference was distinctly pro-abortion. The proceedings are now available in Robert E. Hall (editor), *Abortion in a Changing World*, (2 Vols., Columbia University Press. $10 each). These volumes are particularly valuable for the analyses of the laws and outcomes of those laws of a number of countries throughout the world.

Of a different and more specialized character are some books taking up abortion from a psychiatric and a demographic-sociological perspective. *The Right to Abortion* (Scribner's. $1.95) is a report, quite favorable to abortion, by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. Henry P. David in *Family Planning and Abortion in the Socialist Countries of Central and Eastern Europe* (The Population Council, 245 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017) presents some detailed statistics on abortion in that area. Finally, Bernard J. Ransil, a Catholic physician, offers a moderate and temperate argument in favor of a change in the Church's thinking in *Abortion* (Deus Book, Paulist Press, $1.25).

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They haven't built a case for the note of gloom upon which they conclude.

WALTER J. HICKEL

Secretary of the Interior

Of Dan and Rosemary

Lexington, Mass.

To the Editors: Rosemary Ruether's comments on Dan Berrigan's recent writings (September 4, 1970) constitute, I think, a much needed warning that certain individuals, through media overexposure, tend to become larger-than-life and may even detract attention away from the ultimate ends they pursue. I do not believe this has happened with Dan Berrigan, however. (Eugene McCarthy is closer to an example of an individual made into something he was not and didn't have the energy to become—a fact which led to rather severe disappointment and disillusionment on the part of many of his followers.)

Furthermore, I think she is incorrect to argue that Berrigan's ideology "centered entirely on a type of radical personalism" is a weakness and a defect. Her argument, briefly put, holds that serious structural analysis of the political and economic edifice is, in part, precluded by the kind of personalization of issues exemplified in Father Berrigan's activities and writings. She believes the American Catholic radical movement (the radical movement generally, one presumes) needs the kind of objectivity which she finds prevailing in revolutionary sectors in Latin American Catholicism.

From the beginning of political philosophy, men have questioned whether war, social injustice, economic inequities and other evils have their roots in man himself (the taint of original sin, or primordial urges toward aggressive behavior, or whatever) or whether the basis for injustice and war lie largely outside man — in social and political institutions—and that through altering the institutions one can not only end social evils but eventually change, even perfect, man himself. There is really no satisfactory way to finally settle the argument.

One must ask if a change in consciousness, daring to put one's body on the line, being "reborn" can perhaps serve as a catalyst for social change, or whether such activism is doomed to end in the personality cultism of which Ruether writes. It seems to me that radical personalities who, through their own example, encourage, even demand that others give up a part of their comfort and conservative inactivism (whatever they may profess verbally) will do more, ultimately, to turn this country around than any amount of structural analysis can.

The present situation in Latin America is radically different from that which pertains in the United States. In economically underdeveloped countries with clear-cut class divisions, the relationship of economic and social factors to political policies and strategies is more clearly understood. In America the situation, as one radical put it, is rather more like fighting a marshmallow than a brick wall. The system gives enough, here and there, to co-opt most demands for change, to absorb just a sufficient amount of discontent to maintain itself, to make just the necessary amount of economic and social reform to satisfy most reformers and undermine most radicals. Structural analysis, particularly Marxism, doesn't apply to the many paradoxical aspects of American life and nobody, thus far, has come up with a new Marxism which does. Structural analysis is not impossible, but it is difficult. Of course, a revolutionary Latin American priest can see his job in "socialist structural terms." Such terms make sense in his milieu as they are directly applicable to his country's malaise.

Looking at the American scene, however, it is almost impossible to avoid the existential, or the apocalyptic as Ruether would have it. There is the intense feeling of a society at the breaking point, not *primarily* because of the usual socio-economic variables to which structural analysis addresses itself, but for other more amorphous but nevertheless real reasons, particularly the conflict of cultures and life-styles.

Ultimately, I think, changes in both

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behavior ("inner consciousness") and institutions must be sought because they serve to reinforce one another. One needs structural analysis *and* the Berrigan sort of radical personalism. As Philip Slater puts it: "Change can take place only when institutions have been analyzed, discredited, and disassembled, and the motivational forces that gave rise to them redirected into alternative spheres of gratification." Unique individuals throughout history have served as catalysts for change because through their daring and the ideology upon which their actions are based they have given others the courage and the rationale for acting. This, it seems to me, is what Dan Berrigan has done.

What might be a defect in a relatively stark political and cultural milieu in which the lines of division are clearly drawn (if the "leader" is captured or killed the movement may rapidly fold) can become a strength in another environment—in a society in which, simply to gain a hearing, to get some sort of attention, one must either possess built-in power (by being elected President, for example); purposely seek to gain media attention through massive freak-outs and put-ons (Yippie ideology *a la* Rubin and Hoffman); or possess a personal bravery and charisma and demonstrate how an individual can maintain a sustained commitment without allowing his indignation and radical intent to be diluted (Berrigan). Moral re-birth, constantly risking oneself, leads to that kind of commitment.

Again, for the revolutionary, there is no easy way, for as Slater puts it: "If he feels that some fundamental change in the system is required . . . he has a choice between following a path that subverts his goal (by following the channels of 'legitimate' dissent which implies a commitment to the assumptions of the culture) or one that leads him to be jailed as a criminal or traitor." The Berrigans and others are now jailed and it remains to be seen whether their sacrifice and their radical personalism will have made a difference. To me it seems about the only way one can make a difference in America today.

JEAN B. ELSHTAIN

Next Battleground

To the Editors: Like many preliminary statements, my article "Extending Civil Rights Upward" (Oct. 2) was unpolished, and has one or two minor inaccuracies. Since writing it I have talked with dozens of people involved in some way with higher education. This is my prediction, based largely on their responses.

Graduate schools will be the next major civil rights battleground. The rising aspirations of the working class directly conflict with the growing tendencies to require increased amounts of education for given occupational levels and to make graduate study inacessible to students without independent financial means.

Three ways of achieving equal educational opportunity are possible. The first is self-reform. This is extremely improbable. Like the desegregation of public schools, a massive restructuring of graduate education will involve tremendous problems. Most professors will use these as pretexts for maintenance of the status quo.

The second is legislative compulsion, which I already suggested. This is also improbable. Universities simply have too much political power for that.

Judicial compulsion seems to hold the most promise. A class action suit along the lines of *Brown v. Board of Education* may be the most feasible way to effect change. The basis of the suit might be an 1874 Supreme Court decision which declared that "education in an enlarged sense is to be supplied to rich and poor alike." In 1970 there is no question but that an enlarged sense of education must include doctoral programs at Harvard, Michigan, Illinois, Colorado, Stanford and every other tax-subsidized university in the United States.

DAVID M. GRAY

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

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

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